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Model Predictive Control (MPC) is widely used to achieve performance objectives, while enforcing operational and safety constraints. Despite its high performance, MPC often demands significant computational resources, making it challenging to implement in systems with limited computing capacity. A recent approach to address this challenge is to use the Robust-to-Early Termination (REAP) strategy. At any time instant, REAP converts the MPC problem into the evolution of a virtual dynamical system whose trajectory converges to the optimal solution, and provides guaranteed sub-optimal and feasible solution whenever its evolution is terminated due to limited computational power. REAP has been introduced as a continuous-time scheme and its theoretical properties have been derived under the assumption that it performs all the computations in continuous time. However, REAP should be practically implemented in discrete-time. This paper focuses on the discrete-time implementation of REAP, exploring conditions under which anytime feasibility and convergence properties are maintained when the computations are performed in discrete time. The proposed methodology is validated and evaluated through extensive simulation and experimental studies. 

The Butterfly Attack, introduced in an RTSS 2019 paper, was billed as a new kind of timing attack against control loops in cyber-physical systems. We conduct a close inspection of the Butterfly Attack in order to identify the root vulnerability that it exploits, and show that an appropriate application of real-time scheduling theory provides an effective countermeasure. We propose improved defenses against this and similar attacks by drawing upon techniques from real-time scheduling theory, control theory, and systems implementation, that are both provably secure and are able to make efficient use of computing resources.